Betrayal in Baku: A deep dive on COP29 key outcomes
On November 11, 2024, the 29th Conference of Parties (COP29) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) opened in Baku, capital of petrostate Azerbaijan. Originally scheduled to conclude on November 22, negotiations dragged on until November 24. The conference almost collapsed when developing countries walked out in response to developed countries’ refusal to agree to deliver a more ambitious climate finance deal.
Billed as the ‘Finance COP,’ COP29 was expected to come up with a new climate finance goal to bridge the widening gap of climate financing needs of developing countries deluged by climate disasters. Although Parties at COP29 managed to come up with a finance package, this was marred by last-minute tactics from developed countries that attempted to renegotiate Convention principles and shirk their financing obligations.
COP29 also saw the operationalisation of carbon markets, which critics say is a victory only for corporate lobbyists that flooded the talks. Meanwhile, demands from grassroots movements were largely ignored amid increasing restrictions on independent civil society campaigning. In the end, developing countries and civil society left Baku deeply disappointed, with some stamping COP29 as the ‘Worst COP’ in recent years.
NCQG: ‘No deal is better than a bad deal’
At COP29, the stakes surrounding the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on Climate Finance were high. Developed countries have failed to meet the USD 100 billion annual target, a figure regarded as insufficient to address the growing needs of developing countries. However, the conference fell short of expectations, producing an outcome document that enraged developing countries. Concerns about the scale of financial commitments and the mechanisms for delivering such funds were inadequately addressed.
During the negotiations, developing country blocs pushed for an annual public financing target of USD 1.3 trillion from developed countries in line with principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) and equity. Meanwhile, the EU and the US were adamant about keeping the target at a minimum and held off concrete proposals until the last day–a worn-out tactic to manipulate the talks.
Developing countries and island states walked out from initial negotiations that set USD 250 billion as the goal. The proposed amount pales in comparison to the USD 1.3 trillion demanded by developing countries which is still far below the actual costs developing countries would need to finance their mitigation and adaptation measures and losses and damages. Civil society estimates point to a little below USD 7 trillion per year.
Apart from the quantity, the quality of finance to be delivered was a key topic of debate. The initial text included debt-for-climate swaps, green bonds, guarantees, and equities, including the use of carbon markets as means to raise finance. Developing countries and civil society slammed this, saying this would exacerbate debt burdens and divert resources from communities that need finance.
While the final text did not mention these instruments, it did not stray far from the initial texts. Developed countries are expected ‘to take the lead’ in raising a meagre USD 300 billion until 2035. This target remains largely inadequate and lacks clear subgoals for mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. Assuming a 5% annual inflation rate between 2025 to 2035, the real value of this amount would be significantly lower to around only USD 170 billion by 2035. Analysts also note that this amount, spread across various funding sources, requires minimal additional effort from developed countries.
Additionally, the USD 300 billion would be part of a broader USD 1.3 trillion annual goal from ‘all actors.’ Apart from the absence of a clear public finance core that developing countries called for, the outcome document distributed the burden of responsibility across both developed and developing countries as suggested by the inclusion of ‘voluntary contributions’ from developing countries as part of the goal. This disregards CBDR-RC and equity principles. Some developing countries added that this will not generate any new financing since developed countries’ failure to deliver has led developing countries to spend their strained resources to address climate disasters.
Under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, developed countries are expected to provide and mobilise public finance. Yet, the final text mentioned that the goal can come from ‘a wide variety of sources’ to include private finance and ‘climate-related’ flows from multilateral development banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank, further diminishing developed countries’ responsibility. This means that the profit-oriented private sector and Northern-dominated MDBs would play a central role in meeting global goals despite not being bound by Convention principles or legally obligated to fulfill commitments. Contributions from these actors often come with conditionalities, such as loans or investments that historically exacerbate debt burdens for developing countries, and undermine their development priorities.
The argument for broadening the sources of finance, citing governments’ limited fiscal capacity, does not hold when considering the amount of public money going towards misplaced priorities. In 2022 alone, an estimated USD 7 trillion was spent on fossil fuel subsidies that, if redirected, could prop up ambitious climate goals.
In a bid to end the closing plenary, the President gavelled the text on the NCQG on November 24 despite objections from developing countries. This violation of the established procedure on consensus-building infuriated developing countries who were only allowed to speak after the decision was adopted. India expressed, ‘We are disappointed with the outcome which clearly brings out the unwillingness of the developed country Parties to fulfil their responsibilities.’
In response, civil society rallied: ‘No deal is better than a bad deal.’ Indeed, COP29 failed to address the demands of frontline communities for much-needed climate finance, potentially worsening their plight in the long run.
Article 6: Operationalised at what cost?
At COP29, Parties finalised the rules for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, operationalising international carbon markets after nearly a decade of negotiations. The decision was adopted during the opening plenary despite not going through scrutiny of Parties. While the Presidency hailed the agreement as a ‘breakthrough,’ market-based approaches continue to draw sharp criticisms.
There were three main components of Article 6 up for discussion in Baku: Article 6.2 on the trading of credits (or license to emit) between countries; Article 6.4 about the establishment of an international carbon market; and Article 6.8, which covers non-market approaches.
In Baku, negotiators agreed on rules for Article 6.2, aiming to improve transparency and prevent manipulations like inflating the value or origin of credits. However, the deal lacks strict enforcement or penalties for breaking these rules. Without accountability, developed countries could exploit the system by using questionable credits to meet their targets on paper instead of reducing their emissions. This loophole allows them to shift responsibility to cut emissions onto developing countries.
Meanwhile, the Article 6.4 decision bulldozed by the Presidency in the opening plenary, also leaves much to be desired. Proponents of the new Article 6.4 Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM) pointed to key improvements over its predecessor, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). These include enhanced sustainability safeguards, stricter baselines for calculating emissions reductions, and additionality checks to avoid locking in high-emission projects. Yet, these measures are only superficial fixes that fail to address the fundamental flaws of carbon markets, which often focus on minimising costs for polluters rather than ensuring real emission cuts.
The urgency to mobilise finance for climate action was also used to justify the adoption of Article 6.4. Early draft texts for the NCQG reflected this but faced significant resistance, leading to its eventual omission. CSOs have raised concerns that including carbon markets as a source of finance for the NCQG could undermine its integrity. They warn that this may shift the focus towards private finance flows, allowing developed countries to evade their responsibility to provide public climate finance to developing countries.
The most significant critique of Article 6 outcomes is their reliance on offsetting as a central strategy for achieving climate goals. Offsetting allows developed countries and their corporations to claim emissions reductions by financing projects elsewhere, rather than reducing their own emissions. These mechanisms have historically led to land grabs that displace Indigenous Peoples and local communities, destroy vital resources, and violate rights.
The overriding emphasis placed on market- and offset-based mechanisms has sidelined more transformative, non-market approaches (NMAs) to climate action. These approaches, including community-led initiatives led by grassroots movements and civil society, offer alternatives to effectively address the crisis. While Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement provides a mandate for advancing such solutions, the talks on the matter have stagnated for years now. At COP29, Parties agreed on guidance to operationalise an NMA Platform to facilitate exchange of information and build capacity for NMAs.
UAE Dialogue: Hypocrisy fuels the divide
At COP28 in Dubai, Parties reached an unprecedented commitment to ‘transition away from fossil fuels’ after the Presidency released the outcome of the first Global Stocktake (GST) of the Paris Agreement. All of this was meant to inform the updating of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) due in 2025. But, much like what happened in Bonn last June, Parties clashed over whether the UAE Dialogue established by this Dubai decision will focus on finance or the broader GST outcomes.
Developing countries were divided on this issue, with some pushing for stronger emphasis on climate finance in the dialogue. They cited Paragraph 97 of the GST outcomes, which placed the establishment of the UAE dialogue under the finance section. This supports their position that developed countries’ delivery of finance is a critical enabler of the goals outlined in the Paris Agreement. On the contrary, most developed countries and some developing countries wanted it to follow up on the entire stocktake package.
This divide also emerged in the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), where countries wrestled on whether the GST outcomes should be integrated into the MWP. Developed countries wanted to include headlines from the stocktake outcomes in MWP decision texts, particularly those related to ‘transitioning away from fossil fuels.’ Most developing countries argued that the MWP should be a platform to learn from each other, not introduce messages that will burden developing countries through ‘prescriptive, top-down’ approaches to mitigation. They said doing so would violate the principle of CBDR-RC and undermine the nationally determined nature of NDCs. The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) called out developed countries’ hypocrisy in pushing such messages in the name of raising ambition while failing to meet their own targets and not providing adequate finance to close the gaps in implementation.
On November 21, the Presidency released a package of texts with a number of options: the UAE dialogue will cover 1) only finance; 2) all GST outcomes, including ‘transitioning away from fossil fuels’; 3) all GST outcomes with a focus on finance; or 4) finance for NDCs. Thereafter, the Presidency called for a ‘Qurultay,’ meaning ‘meeting’ in Azeri, to supposedly bridge opposing views.
After the meeting, succeeding drafts released reaffirmed the language from the GST outcomes but without clear mechanisms for tracking implementation, proposing a diluted two-year discussion instead. This outcome drew criticism from blocs like Alliance of Small Island States and the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean, leaving Parties without consensus.
In the end, the Presidency reached a procedural decision to pass a heavily bracketed informal note to the next round of talks in June 2025, with the aim of reaching a resolution by COP30 in November 2025.
Loss and Damage: One step forward, two steps back
COP29 was anticipated to finalise operational details for the Loss and Damage Fund, formally known as the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage. While this was technically achieved, hopes that the so-called ‘Finance COP’ would finally deliver financial commitments for climate-vulnerable communities were not fully realised.
In Baku, a host country agreement was signed between the Board of the Fund and the Philippines, alongside secretariat hosting and trustee agreements with the World Bank. The involvement of the World Bank, however, remains contentious given its support for fossil fuel projects, high administrative costs, stringent interest rates, and policy conditionalities. These issues prompted Parties at COP28 last year to draw up conditions for the Bank before taking on a role.
Another development at COP29 was the adoption of arrangements between the Convention and the Board to ensure the latter is accountable to and works under the guidance of the Convention. Despite progress in institutional arrangements, financial contributions to the FRLD remain inadequate. Developed countries have only pledged USD 692 million, with Sweden committing about USD 19 million at COP29. This figure is a fraction of the estimated USD 728 billion needed to address losses and damages in developing countries.
To this end, much of the attention at COP29 has shifted from the Fund’s operationalisation towards demanding adequate finance for loss and damage and integrating loss and damage into the new climate finance goal.
Developing countries asserted that there be a dedicated subgoal for loss and damage in the NCQG to ensure sustained financial flows for this critical area. They emphasised the importance of grants over loans in order to prevent vulnerable countries who are already dealing with unmanageable debt levels from becoming even more indebted. Although it had bracketed material on grants and access methods, the negotiation text that was made public during the first week of COP29 somewhat mirrored these priorities by mentioning loss and damage across a number of options. However, attempts to broaden the scope of activities covered by the NCQG, including financing for loss and damage, were thwarted by developed countries.
In the end, the final text merely acknowledged the frequency of loss and damage and the finance gap but failed to include explicit commitments for financing loss and damage.
In parallel, the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) on loss and damage, a work programme under the UNFCCC to address the impacts of climate change on developing countries, underwent a review process in Baku. This was meant to scrutinise the activities conducted by the WIM through its policy arm, the Executive Committee (ExCom), and the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage (SNLD), which focuses on providing technical support.
At the WIM review, developed countries made lofty statements about the importance of maintaining the 1.5°C goal and supporting vulnerable countries yet resisted efforts to bolster the WIM’s third function of enhancing action and support. They also proposed dismantling the WIM ExCom’s Expert Group focused on this function despite calls from developing countries to place emphasis on it. Meanwhile, G77 and China pushed for regional offices for the SNLD and a dedicated loss and damage ‘gap report,’ that was blocked yet again by developed countries, citing concerns over reporting frequency and details.
These unresolved disagreements over elements of the WIM review and SNLD governance led to the postponement of critical decisions until the next Bonn climate talks in June 2025.
Just Transition or just a talkshop?
Negotiations in Baku on the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) remain deadlocked over key elements of the programme, particularly its scope. Developed countries advocated for a focus on mitigation, whereas developing countries emphasised the need to address broader socio-economic dimensions, including adaptation and finance. This impasse ultimately led to the collapse of the talks on the JTWP.
Intended to establish pathways to minimise the impacts of the climate transition, the JTWP became a battleground of conflicting priorities. Developing countries called for an actionable work plan to avoid turning the programme into a mere talkshop. Developed countries said this would be a ‘premature’ move, signalling reluctance to commit to binding obligations.
The co-chair managed to release a draft text by the end of the first week, receiving a lukewarm reception from the Parties. Failing to reach a consensus, negotiations were expected to persist into the second week of the COP. The Presidency, however, forwent formal meetings on the matter, which left both Parties and civil society in a state of uncertainty. A new negotiating text was released only a day before the scheduled conclusion of the COP.
In a last-minute effort, the Presidency convened a contact group late into the night. Developing countries expressed frustration over the lack of clarity, missing proposals, and the bracketing of key principles such as equity and CBDR-RC, as well as the ‘right to development,’ which some developed countries sought to delete. Developing countries, including the Like-Minded Developing Countries, African Group, and LDCs, pushed for recognition of historical responsibilities and tangible commitments, while developed countries like the US, EU, and UK resisted references to Convention principles and language implying accountability.
On the intended final day of COP29, a new draft still failed to reconcile Parties’ differing positions. Thus, the conference ended with no agreement on the JTWP text, leaving Parties to extend discussions into the following year.
Polluters in, peoples out?
Civil society remains the moral compass of these conferences, amplifying the voices of frontline communities and exposing the failures of governments to pursue meaningful climate action. Yet, time and again, UNFCCC rules have systematically chipped away at these critical spaces for dissent.
Prior to joining COP29, civil society had to contend with the high cost of travel, food, and lodging, which kept many grassroots organisations, especially from the global South, from participating. To make matters worse, food prices inside the conference itself would usually cost a staggering AZN 20 to 40 (USD 12 to 24) per meal, which equates to a whole day’s food budget for most of the developing world. This signals a lack of basic concern for the thousands of civil society observers who have travelled far with limited resources to participate in the climate talks.
Inside the conference halls, protest actions were boxed in by heavy regulations. Banners and posters required pre-approval from the UNFCCC secretariat, while the number of participants per action was kept to a limited number. In some cases, even approved actions were abruptly canceled. These foretell a worrying normalisation of censorship within these spaces.
The repression did not stop at protest actions. Observers were repeatedly pushed out from negotiation rooms, and livestreams were either unavailable or cut off before sessions could even adjourn. With key decisions made behind closed doors, civil society was shut out of discussions that directly impact their lives.
Parties were also not immune to undemocratic processes. At the opening plenary, the Presidency sought to gavel the recommendations of the Supervisory Body of the Article 6.4 mechanism without inputs from countries. In a similar fashion, the closing plenary saw the adoption of a number of contentious documents, such as the NCQG, without opening the floor for objections from Parties. Adding to these concerns were reports alleging Saudi Arabia received access to and tampered with negotiating texts, further undermining trust in the process.
While civic spaces erode, corporate influence at COPs has been on the rise. Research published by the Kick Big Polluters Out coalition says there were 1773 recorded fossil fuel lobbyists at COP29. While this may just be the tip of the iceberg, considering that some lobbyists enter the halls incognito, this outnumbers the delegation of the 10 most vulnerable countries.
Notwithstanding the hurdles, activists from across the globe came together in demanding climate justice during the entirety of the conference. Still, the exclusionary tactics imposed in these spaces call for some reflection: How can we collectively resist these repressive conditions? What can we do to ensure that the voices of the most harmed peoples are at the forefront of climate action?
The road to COP30
In 2025, COP30 will be held in the heart of the Amazon in Belem, Brazil, which is yet another petrostate. Early indications surrounding what is currently dubbed the ‘Nature COP’ point to a focus on advancing the global energy transition and enhancing the role of nature in climate policy. Brazil is currently cooperating with Colombia, the country hosting the COP16 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, in a bid to bridge the two talks through a new global treaty for tracing the supply chains of minerals critical to the energy transition process.
With new NDCs due in February 2025, COP30 will be a significant political moment to press governments to commit to ambitious goals. As COP30’s theme suggests, effective climate action must include ecosystem conservation and restoration, the undoing of profit-driven and extractive economic systems, along with the protection of Indigenous Peoples, communities, as well as environmental and human rights defenders at the forefront of these efforts.
Plans for a civil society-led counter-summit and a large “Peoples’ March” are also underway. The last time such an initiative was seen was at COP26 in Glasgow. These independent efforts aim to carve out spaces for cross-movement interface and amplify the voices of Indigenous Peoples, global South communities, and climate justice movements.
Thirty years since the first COP is a good moment to reflect on how these talks have moved us, if at all, towards addressing the root causes of climate change. This year’s COP is a glaring example of how the elites’ economic interests and state repression will persist in undermining multilateral climate action and reinforcing barriers to meaningful change. The road towards Belem and beyond must therefore centre on confronting these entrenched powers and challenging the systems underpinning the climate crisis.
